There has been much interest recently in analyzing the impact of macroeconomic adjustment and stabilization policies on poverty and on the social sectors. Some observers, such as Jolly (1985) , Jolly and Cornia (1984) , UNICEF (1984) , and Cornia, Jolly, and Stewart (1987, 1988) , have concluded that recent structural adjustment programs (SAPS) in developing economies have had substantial deleterious effects on human resources, especially those of the poor. These observers have been effective in persuading a number of influential international organizations, including the World Bank, to be more sensitive to these concerns, with the result that there has been more and more international attention paid to the human implications of macroeconomic adjustment policies.
Others, however, such as Glewwe and de Tray (1988) , have argued that in many countries, particularly in Africa, most of the poor are not adversely affected by adjustment policies (and many may actually be helped) in part because ;no'st pooi households are rural. Poor, rural households are often insulated against shocks brought about by adjustment efforts because of self-provision of many necessities, and in fact may even benefit from the relative price changes that typically result from devaluation and trade liberalization (Krueger, Schiff, and Valdes 1988; Behrman 1990b Behrman , 1990c . In a case study for Indonesia, Ravallion and Huppi (1989) and Huppi and Ravallion (1990) have shown that macroeconomic adjustment actually coincided with a significantly reduced incidence of poverty. Poverty decreased partly because of increases in agricultural export prices induced by the adjustment program and partly because of the lagged effects of previous poverty eradication efforts.
Despite the greater awareness of issues related to the effects of adjustment, considerable uncertainty remains about the human impact of adjustment, because of the analytical and methodological difficulties of measuring the effects of adjustment on the poor and on the social sectors. A full treatment of the impact would involve the evaluation of a counterfactual situation in a complicated general equilibrium framework. The evidence presented to date on this issue is not the result of such a complicated analysis, and a complete treatment also will not be attempted here. In this article, we utilize time-series data for Jamaica to examine whether macroeconomic adjustment, initiated in the early 1980s but intensified in 1984-8S, was associated with significant deterioration in various indicators of health, nutritional, and welfare outcomes, particularly among the poor. The purpose of this exercise is simply to determine what actually happened to the socioeconomic position of Jamaica's poor during structural adjustment.
I. ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS
The impact of policy changes undertaken in an adjustment program on the human capital-particularly health, nutrition, and schooling-of the poor depends on (i) the effect of adjustment policies on the incomes of and prices facing the poor, and (ii) the effect of income and price changes on the human capital behavior of the poor.
A number of researchers have attempted to map the first relationship, namely, the theoretical linkage between the incomes of and prices faced by the poor and specific adjustment policies, such as currency devaluation, contractionary monetary and fiscal policies, wage and price controls, and foreign trade liberalization (Addison and Demery 1985; Behrman 1988; Scobie 1989; Glewwe and de Tray 1988) . The consensus of this literature is that, although economic theory provides a framework for analyzing these links, the number of such links and their complex interactions make it virtually impossible to predict a priori the impact of adjustment policy instruments on the resources controlled by the poor.
The second link-namely, between changes in income or price and the household outcomes of interest, such as health, nutrition, and schooling-has been the subject of much recent research (see surveys by Deolalikar 1988, and Behrman 1990a) . The economics of household decisionmaking suggest that, because of the possibility of substitution by households-among diverse sources of nutrient intakes, across the food intakes and labor supplies of different household members, and among various health and schooling inputsit is difficult to predict the magnitude (and in some cases the direction) of the impact of changing incomes and prices on household human capital outcomes without careful empirical studies. For instance, if the price of foods which are important nutrient sources increases or incomes decrease as the result of an economic adjustment program, households could shift to cheaper nutrient sources or could reduce leakages between food they obtained and that which is consumed by household members. Recent studies indicate that even for very poor households nutrient intakes are adjusted only 1-3 percent for 10 percent changes in income (see, for example, Behrman and Deolalikar 1987 , Bouis and Haddad 1990 , Strauss and Thomas 1990 , and Behrman 1990d . Similarly, the loss by one member of the household of a formal sector job as the result of an adjustment program may be offset in part with regard to short-run income effects by increased activities of other members of the household in the informal sector. To the extent that this occurs, it may be at the cost of long-run human capital investments (for example, keeping children out of school), which again are difficult to predict a priori. Thus, how reduced incomes and increased consumption prices affect the human capital decisions of the poor is largely an empirical issue-one on which there is little consensus. Indeed, at a certain level, the question of how macroeconomic adjustment affects the poor is the wrong question to ask, because adjustment policies are not homogenous, and it is possible, within limits, for a government to choose policies that differ in their adverse effects on the poor. For instance, food subsidies and cheap food policies are often the first casualties of economic adjustment programs. There is sufficient evidence to show that removal of food subsidies can be detrimental to the poor (Pinstrup-Andersen 1985 , 1986a , 1986b . However, many food subsidy programs have almost excessively broad coverage, and their cost can be reduced without severely affecting the real income of most of the poor. In Morocco, for example, Mateus and others (1986) estimate that the highest 30 percent of the income distribution received 47 percent of the subsidies, and the lowest 30 percent received only 16 percent of the subsidies. Ahmed (1979) reports that in Bangladesh two-thirds of the subsidized grain was distributed to urban areas even though most of the poor people reside in rural areas. For such cases, if targeting the poor and nutritionally vulnerable is administratively and politically feasible at a reasonable cost, it may be attractive from the point of view of structural adjustment programs. Targeted costs tend to rise as efforts to limit leakages to other groups increase, but Mateus and others (1986) , Gavan and Chandrasekera (1979) , and Alderman and von Braun (1985) argue that substantial reductions in the governmental budget and distribution costs of existing general cheap food policies can be achieved by effective targeting. Targeting measures such as subsidization of inferior foods (that is, those 294 THE WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW, VOL. 5, NO. 2 that are consumed less as income increases) and direct distribution of food to those thought to be most vulnerable (for example, infants and pregnant women) could result in lower budgetary expenditures on cheap food programs without directly worsening the position of most of the poor (see also Pinstrup-Andersen and Alderman 1986, and Rodgers 1986) . A cheap food program is not the only policy related to the social sectors that may be cut as part of an economic adjustment program. Direct cuts in health services may have both an immediate and a long-run impact, and cuts in education may have a long-run impact given some evidence regarding the direct relations between better education and improved health and nutrition (see, for example, Isenman 1980; Behrman and Wolfe 1984 , 1987 , 1989 Rosenzweig and Schultz 1982; Behrman 1982, 1987) . Jimenez (1987) provides a recent survey of pricing policy for health and education in developing countries. He concludes that the efficiency gains from user charges for selected types of health and education services (that is, those for which the benefits accrue primarily to the individuals concerned, such as hospital care and university education) could be substantial. He adds that the impact of increased user charges need not be inequitable, because "the present distribution of subsidies tends to be highly skewed toward higher income groups, who obtain greater access to more costly social services . . . even if they are uniformly free for all. Under these circumstances, the expansionary effect of fee increases for selected services (and if possible, for selected individuals) may actually improve equity in the distribution of public resources."
Such a characterization suggests that as part of adjustment packages, social programs in health or education could be altered through selected user charges so that the poor would not be adversely affected. Politically, this may be very difficult, perhaps even more difficult than food targeting-and if it were done, there would seem to be no good reason to reverse the process at the end of the adjustment program.
Recent studies of Indonesia Huppi 1989 and Ravallion 1990 ) emphasize that structural adjustment and policy reforms, initiated in 1983 because of external macroeconomic shocks, contained elements specifically aimed at sustaining Indonesia's past progress on poverty reduction. These studies conclude that the incidence of poverty continued to decline substantially during the initial adjustment period (namely, between 1984 and 1987) . There were three main factors responsible for Indonesia's success. The first was the ongoing growth of agricultural income that resulted from real exchange rate depreciations that offset lower agricultural export prices, maintenance of subsidies for agricultural inputs (for example, fertilizer and pesticides), and improvement in the rural terms of trade caused by diversification away from rice and toward more profitable crops. The second was the combination of trade and industrial deregulation with real exchange rate adjustments, which resulted in rapid expansion of output and employment in the non-oil manufacturing sector. And the third was the maintenance of routine governmental expenditures and federal transfers to the provinces, both of which have larger poverty-alleviation elements than development expenditures, and the reallocation of development expenditures away from industry and mining and into povertyrelated sectors, such as food and export agriculture and human resource development. The Indonesian experience suggests that generalizations about the impact of economic adjustment must be tempered to take account of differential impacts depending on how an adjustment program is structured and implemented.
II. ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT, THE POOR, AND THE SOCIAL SECTORS IN JAMAICA Following a long period of macroeconomic deterioration, Jamaica initiated its structural adjustment program in 1981, with assistance from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The program included, among other things, several adjustments to the real exchange rate, import liberalization, fiscal and tax reforms, and reduced government expenditures (Behrman and Deolalikar 1989) . Initial implementation of the structural adjustment program was slow, with many of the policy measures being adopted forcefully only in 1984 and 1985 (Cornia and Stewart 1987) .
Although there has been considerable interest in the impact of the Jamaican adjustment program on the poor and on their human resources, previous studies (Cornia and Stewart 1987; Boyd 1988) do not formalize the links between economic adjustment and the poor and their human resources. They instead use secondary data to characterize some of these links relating to unemployment, the composition of governmental expenditures, and direct indicators of health, nutrition, and education.
There are a number of methodological difficulties in rigorously assessing the impact of adjustment. Such an assessment would require the evaluation of a counterfactual situation in which individuals and households are affected by prices, incomes, and governmental services with the possibility of substantial substitutions-all within an economywide framework with complicated concurrent and lagged interactions. Because of exogenous factors, lags, feedbacks, and substitutions, simple correlations between economic adjustment policies and changes in the well-being of the poor must be interpreted with extreme care. Ideally, one would evaluate policies using a well-specified economywide model with the behavior of poor households embedded within the system. Such models, however, are rarely available.
The problem of identifying a counterfactual is even more severe. Even with a properly formulated economywide model, it is difficult to predict what alternative policies a government might have pursued, and whether their impact on the poor would have been more or less severe than the effect of policies that were actually adopted. What would have happened if no adjustment had taken place? Would the poor have been better off in the short run but worse off when (and if) the eventual collapse had come? In evaluating the impact of an adjustment program, then, the relevant comparison is not obvious.
The methodology used here is simple and, like the previous studies, ignores many of these complex issues (which leads to limitations, as discussed below). We attempt only to establish the "facts" of whether the socioeconomic indicators of interest for Jamaica deviated significantly during the narrowly defined adjustment period (1984-85) from their underlying secular trends. Each indicator's secular trend is estimated in a simple regression, and we test for a statistically significant shift in this relation during 1984-85. Each regression is of the form, ln(indicator), = aO + alt + C1 2 t 2 + a 3 D. The linear and quadratic time terms give the secular path in the dependent variable. The quadratic time term allows for the possibility that the Jamaican economy was coming out of its long deteriorating experience in the mid-and late 1980s because of the adjustment program or for other reasons. The last term, D, is a dummy variable equal to 1 in 1984-85. If its estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero, we can conclude that the relevant indicator in 1984-85 differs from the secular trend. (We define statistical significance of a 3 via a t-test at the 10 percent level.) First-order autocorrelation coefficients also are included if they are significant, but their inclusion does not change the basic results discussed below. Although rudimentary, this "reduced-form" approach permits determination of whether the critical adjustment years differed from the preceding (and, to a lesser extent, succeeding) secular trend in terms of social indicators, as opposed to being "bad" years within a longer experience, a distinction that unfortunately is not made in much of the commentary on the impact of SAPS and stabilization programs. This approach certainly has its limitations. Given the limited length of the available data series, we cannot examine the long-run effects of the adjustment program, some of which may still be in the making. (Our data series do not go beyond 1987.) The secular trends, moreover, do not necessarily represent the counterfactual paths that would have been followed if there had not been an adjustment program or if the adjustment program had been of a different nature. Also, the significant deviations, or lack thereof, cannot be attributed to the Jamaican adjustment and stabilization program alone, because there is no control for other contemporaneous events, such as changes in the world market for bauxite-Jamaica's leading export commodity. What this procedure reveals is whether the indicators of poverty, health, nutrition, and schooling deteriorated significantly, for whatever reasons, from their underlying secular trends during the critical adjustment years. The results may be suggestive of what the impact of the SAP was without the very difficult and expensive development of a general equilibrium model. And although we do not describe an economywide model, we do attempt to explore systematically in a limited way some dimensions of the relevant structural relations.
Boyd's summary of the Jamaican 1984-85 adjustment experience (1988, pp.
153-54) concludes:
There is considerable evidence that economic policies . . . have served to worsen the condition of the poor in Jamaica. . . . The economic adjustment policies of the 1980s . . . have had considerable stagflationary effect. The impact on the poor has also been considerable, with decline in quan-tity and quality of public services on every front-health, education, housing, and water-and increasing costs for what exists. The government has sought to mitigate these effects by its welfare programme, primarily its Food Aid Programme. This . . . programme . . . has not been sufficient to offset the adverse development on nutrition arising from falling real incomes and rising relative food prices. There has been a marked increase in malnutrition among children. . . . The removal of subsidies, increasing redundancies and unemployment, and the reduction in social and economic services, inter alia, have all had direct adverse effects of significant magnitude . . . In 1984-85, devaluation was approximately 44 percent more rapid than the trend, real governmental expenditure per capita fell 11.5 percent below the trend, and the current account increased significantly. But a number of other indicators-including real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, the consumer price index, investment, imports, and exports-did not deviate significantly from the trend in 1984-85. Thus the evidence available suggests that the overall macro impact of the adjustment program in these years was not as negative as Boyd (1988) and Cornia and Stewart (1987) suggest.
Examination of deviations from the trends for macroeconomic indicators (

Changes in Employment and Income
The total unemployment rate peaked in 1982 and declined monotonically thereafter with no significant deviation from the trend in 1984-85 (see table 2 ). Unemployment in Jamaica is defined to include both those who are actively seeking jobs and those who are not actively seeking jobs, but the results reported here hold whether total unemployment or only unemployment among job seekers is considered. de Tray (1985) argue that unemployment rates for women and youth are particularly important indicators of labor market conditions because these groups are more marginal labor force participants than are adult males. Female employment may be particularly related to health, nutrition, and education in Jamaica, where almost half of the households with children are female-headed. But the unemployment rates for females and for youth in 1984-85 also indicate no significant deviations from the trends. Boyd (1988) emphasizes the increasing "informalization" of Jamaican employment as evidence of deteriorating labor market conditions. The best available measure of informalization is the share of self-employed and independent workers in total employment, which rose from 39.1 percent in 1983 to 41.0 percent in 1984 and 42.7 percent in 1985. But the support for Boyd's informalization conjecture seems quite limited despite these increases, because 1983 appears to be an anomaly: in each of the four previous years the informal employment share was more than 40 percent, with the 1981 share at 42.7 percent and the 1982 share at 42.6 percent. In addition, neither the number nor the share of workers who were self-employed or in independent occupations in 1984-85 differed significantly from the trends.
Even for those in the paid labor force, of course, employment is only part of what determines income; movements in real wages are another important factor in income fluctuations. Wage data for Jamaica are quite limited, but the median wages reported in the labor force survey relative to the consumer price index are an indicator of real wages. There is no evidence of significant deviations in 1984-85 from the secular trends in the real median wages for men or for women. As discussed in detail in Behrman and Deolalikar (1989) , the 1983 values seem anomalous, so that there appear to be drops from 1983 to 1984-85, but not a significant deviation below the secular trends defined over longer time periods (and, in fact, the median real wages in 1984-85 exceeded those for 1978-82). Of course, many of the poor do not receive most of their income from wage labor. A major alternative source of income for the rural poor is agricultural production of nonexport crops. We examined all nine indicators that we could locate for nonexport agricultural quantities, prices, and domestic product, and the only significant deviation was in the GDP deflator for the agricultural sector as a whole. Finally, some of the poor receive income in the form of governmental welfare and social security transfers, but these also do not reflect any significant deviations from the trends for 1984-85. Thus the available evidence does not seem to support any significant deleterious effect coincident with the 1984-85 adjustment program in employment, real wages, agricultural income of the poor, or governmental transfers to the poor. Food and Nutrition, and Health Cornia and Stewart (1987, p. 115) claim that "educational expenditure per head of the population aged 0-14 declined by 40 percent" (apparently from 1981-82 to 1985-86) . However, we calculated the decline in real governmental expenditures on education per child age 5-14 between 1983-84 and 1985-86 to be only 0.1 percent. This sharp difference appears to reflect three factors. First, Cornia and Stewart apparently used the overall GDP deflator instead of the sector-specific deflator. Since real wages in education dropped sharply over this time period, they substantially overstate the real resource decline. Second, Cornia and Stewart refer to a longer period in which the secular trend in such real expenditure was negative, not just to 1984-85. Third, although the population grew by 2.7 percent between 1983 and 1985, the number of children age 5-14 actually declined by 1.7 percent, so that including young, non-school-aged children skews the per capita expenditure downward. In addition, regressions for available time series data on education inputs and outputs generally indicate no significant negative deviations for 1984-85, with the single exception of output of crafts, production process, and operating workers per 100,000 population (see table 3 ).
Changes in Education,
Private real food expenditures are available in the national accounts for ten food groups. For none of these groups is there a significantly negative deviation from the trends for 1984-85 (see table 4). Moreover, for total food, root crops, and sugar and sugar products (and for bread and cereals at the 15 percent level of significance) the deviations are significantly positive. Total food imports per capita in U.S. dollars did not deviate significantly from the trend, though there was a significant shift from meat and meat preparations to dairy products (and, at the 15 percent level, to cereals and cereal preparations). Thus average real food expenditure increased in 1984-85, and the compositional shifts tended to be toward staples, which suggests that the increased real food expenditure was not primarily the result of increases in expenditure by those at the upper end of the income distribution. Such results do not support the hypothesis of a major deterioration in food and nutrient intakes among the poor in 1984-85.
We also used the food data to estimate linear food expenditure relations and found that the elasticity of food consumption with respect to total consumption expenditure is 0.74. This implies that real food expenditure would drop 1.9 percent with the 2.5 percent drop in real product per capita in 1984 and 4.3 percent with the 5.8 percent drop in real product per capita in 1985. The use of these estimated expenditure relations to predict real food expenditure suggests the possibility of some deterioration in nutrition intakes in 1984-85, even if the data from which the relations are estimated do not. But these more pessimistic estimates do not necessarily imply a serious deterioration in nutrient intakes. A number of studies of poorer populations suggest that people with more income tend to pay substantially more per unit of nutrients than do poorer people, presumably because they buy higher quality food and have greater food leakages. This result holds even though the poor sometimes pay more for food of identical quality because they cannot make bulk purchases, and even if the poor at the margin have higher propensities to purchase and to consume basic nutri- ents out of additional income than do those who are better off (see, for example, Strauss and Thomas 1990) . The 1984 Jamaican consumption expenditure survey permits estimates of nutrient elasticities with respect to total expenditure for different income ranges (table 5) . For the lowest income range, these elasticities are generally between 0.3 and 0.4. These elasticities are likely to be overestimates if actual nutrient intakes as a proportion of household nutrient purchases decline with income as a result of greater food losses and more provision of food to others (for example, laborers, guests), as emphasized by Bouis and Haddad (1990) , or if there is bulk purchase of staples and the reference period for the expenditure survey is relatively short, as demonstrated by Behrman (1988) . In fact, if one can judge by the careful Strauss and Thomas (1990) estimates for Brazil, the failure to control for such factors more than offsets any nonlinearities in the relationship between elasticities and income levels. Strauss and Thomas report sharp nonlinearities, but their preferred estimates indicate an elasticity of nutrient intakes with respect to income for the very poor below the estimates given here. Our elasticities imply that with a 5 percent drop in real food expenditures, nutrient intakes would drop no more than 2 percent. This does not seem to suggest substantial deterioration in nutrient intakes in 1984-85. Of more interest than the nutrient intakes are the indicators of the impact of nutrients. The two most-cited indicators for which there are time series data are the percentage of admissions of children under five years old at Bustamente Children's Hospital because of malnutrition or malnutrition-gastroenteritis, and the percentage distribution of children age 0-3 years by the Gomez classification of normal and grades I, II, and III malnutrition according to anthropometric measures. Hospital admissions with malnutrition increased from 2.1 percent in 1983, to 2.4 percent in 1984, and to 3.7 percent in 1985, and those with malnutrition and gastroenteritis increased from 2.0, to 2.7, and to 4.7 percent in these three years, respectively.
At first sight this might seem to be strong evidence of increasing malnutrition (Boyd 1988; Cornia and Stewart 1987) . However, there are five important qualifications in interpreting these data. First, the same data source indicates that from 1983 to 1984 the percentage of admissions for malnutrition and/or gastroenteritis (a third category in the original data that is not reported by Boyd) fell from 23.5 to 19.0 percent, so the slight increases noted above for 1984 may only reflect changes in categorization between malnutrition with gastroenteritis versus simply gastroenteritis. (The same is true to a much lesser extent in 1985.) Second, the patients admitted to one hospital are not likely to be representative of the affected population in different regions and classes, though it is hard to know which way this biases such an indicator. Third, the increased percentages for malnutrition and malnutrition-gastroenteritis in 1984 and 1985 reflect not only increases in the absolute numbers of children admitted for these diseases, but also a decline in the total admissions from 4,709 in 1983 to 4,512 in 1984 and 3,369 in 1985. It might be strange to conclude that this component of the changed percentages reflects that children were worse off in 1984 and 1985. Fourth, the demand for hospitalization is usually thought to be income-elastic, and thus it increases with income for a given health status, rather than vice versa. Fifth, there are not significant deviations in 1984-85 from the secular trend for such admissions (see table 4 ). For all of these reasons, substantial caution should be used in interpreting these hospital admissions numbers.
The percentages of children in each Gomez category of nourishment shifted in 1984 and 1985 to indicate greater malnutrition, with the percentage normal dropping from 74.2 percent in 1983 to 72.9 percent in 1984 and 1985. The decrease in the percentage share of normal children was distributed across all three grades of malnourishment. Again, some caution is needed in interpretation for several reasons. First, the quarterly variations in the data are considerable, But three of the six coefficients of recurrent expenditures are significantly negative-those for the percentage of children with Gomez grade II and those for malnutrition and malnutrition-gastroenteritis cases as a percentage of hospital admissions.
We also estimate relations for the same dependent variables with right-side variables including real per capita GDP (with significantly negative coefficients for Gomez grade II and for malnutrition admissions), hospital beds per capita (with a significantly negative coefficient for malnutrition-gastroenteritis admissions), and population per physician (significantly negative for the Gomez normal category and positive for all of the others except Gomez III) (table 7) . These significant coefficients provide some support for the interpretation of the Gomez indicators and hospital malnutrition admissions as reflecting more general health and nutrition conditions, and thus create greater confidence that to the extent that they deviated in 1984-85, they reflect some true nutritional deterioration, at least for children, during 1984-85. There are a number of indicators of health inputs and health outcomes for which time series are long enough to allow investigation of whether the values for 1984-85 differed significantly from the underlying secular trends (see table  8 ). Although no significant change in 1984-85 is noted for most of the health Source: Behrman and Deolalikar (1989) , appendix A. Note: The regressions were run with the indicator in natural logarithmic form. T-ratios are in parentheses.
Source: Behrman and Deolalikar (1989) , appendix A.
input variables, there is a positive change in the number of beds in governmental hospitals, and negative changes in total real governmental expenditures per capita on health (indicating a downward shift of 14.6 percent) and for the capital component of health expenditure (a downward shift of 46.2 percent). These downward shifts in governmental real health expenditures are large and would seem to have negative short-and long-run implications, even though any such deduction must be qualified because of the absence of any other indicators of significant downward shifts in health inputs (and the one positive shift noted above). Indicators of health outcomes exhibit no significant deviation in 1984-85 from the secular trends. The lack of a significant impact on health outcomes may indicate that increased efficiencies in health care delivery have offset most of the short-run negative impact of governmental health expenditure cuts, but the long-term effects cannot be measured here.
III. CONCLUSIONS
In summarizing the empirical results, it should be remembered that our conclusions must be qualified because of limited data, lags in the adjustment process, and complexities, substitution, and feedback both on a micro and a macro level. First, there is some evidence of an initial negative macro impact in 1984-85 in terms of indicators such as per capita GDP and inflation, followed by medium-term improvements. But focusing on deviations from the secular trends to see if the situation worsened significantly in 1984-85 relative to the underlying movements (rather than just whether it was bad) leads to a much less negative assessment of the situation in these years than by some previous analysts, such as Boyd (1988) , Cornia and Stewart (1987) , and Davies and Anderson (1987) . If, in fact, the macro effects were smaller than often claimed, of course, the impact on the poor and on their human resources would also have been smaller. Second, the negative short-run effects on employment and distribution also seem limited, and again more limited than suggested by other observers. Most of the short-run impact on employment, in fact, seems to have been neutral or positive, without significant negative deviations from the secular trends even for the most vulnerable demographic groups, such as youth and women. Moreover, the efforts to keep food prices low for the benefit of consumers possibly had an ongoing negative impact on the incomes of some of the poorer Jamaicans in agriculture, though the evidence on this possibility is limited. Governmental transfers and services almost certainly fell in real terms, though not so much from the underlying trends, as is often suggested; and in Jamaica, as in other countries, these programs tend to affect middle-income groups much more than the poorest.
Third, governmental expenditures on social services undoubtedly declined in real terms, and in the aggregate in 1984 and 1985 they were significantly below the trend. Nevertheless, the evidence of short-term deterioration in these sectors is limited. Only one out of ten educational indicators shows a significantly negative deviation for 1984-85. Real per capita food expenditure seemed stable despite income declines and real food price increases, perhaps in part because of some success in food programs. The small nutrient elasticities with respect to total food expenditure suggest that part of the explanation for nutritional developments was the substitution of lower-cost nutrients for more expensive ones (a pattern also observed in food imports), which may result in some important welfare losses, but relatively small nutrient intake deterioration for most Jamaicans. Nevertheless, there is some evidence, despite considerable qualifications about the data, of some nutritional deterioration for small children, though probably with subsequent recovery after 1984-85. For nonnutrient healthrelated indicators of inputs and outputs, there were about as many positive as negative changes in 1984-85, and very few significant deviations from the trends, despite drops in real governmental health expenditures per capita.
Concerns about the impact of adjustment on the poor and on the social sectors have multiplied and are more and more at least part of the policy discussion, if not always a part of policy design and implementation. Adjustment programs may have deleterious effects on the poor and on the social sectors, but the empirical evidence presented to date is not very convincing as a result of confusion about levels, trends, and deviations from the trends as well as questionable data interpretations. More careful and thorough analysis that clarifies the impact of alternative adjustment policies on the poor and on the social sectors and identifies policy instruments with which to cushion the poor from the adverse effects of adjustment will be needed, because macroeconomic adjustment will continue to be a reality in much of the developing world.
